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The current chapter presents an overview of the economic literature on
technology progress, international technology diﬀusion and productivity
growth.1 This literature has a long history and is quite extensive. The
aim of the current chapter is to bring together the insights from diﬀerent
strands in order to show how the issue of international technology dif-
fusion is embedded in the growth literature. The survey shows how the
diﬀerent theoretical and empirical approaches compare to each other.
This forms the basis for the research in the next chapters, where the
joint use of the diﬀerent strands clariﬁes how international technology
diﬀusion aﬀects catching up and convergence.
The chapter starts with reviewing the work of economic historians
and empirical scholars who explicitly studied individual cases of tech-
nology diﬀusion and their impact on growth (Section 2.2). These schol-
ars demonstrated that technology diﬀusion is rather slow, and diﬀers
across countries, sectors and time periods. Growth diﬀerences can persist
over a rather long time, but can also change radically, creating cases of
‘leapfrogging’ (taking over and falling behind). However, the approach of
these empiricists is often descriptive, and does not explicitly describe the
causal link between technology diﬀusion and macro-economic growth.
This literature also often fails to translate the micro-economic insights
to a macro-economic level.
In the 1950s and the 1960s, some early theoretical macro-economic
growth models addressed innovation and human capital (Sections 2.3.1
1This chapter is an updated version of Rensman (1996).
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and 2.3.2). These models were, in ﬁrst instance, inspired by some ‘styl-
ized facts’, but developed further independently from the empirical lit-
erature of the time. In this theoretical work, neoclassical and Keynesian
doctrines competed with each other (Section 2.3.3). The neoclassical
model of Solow became the starting point of empirical analysis for the
emerging growth accounting literature (Section 2.3.4). The reduction of
the large Solow residual, which was assumed to contain disembodied
innovation, was a challenge for the growth accountants.
Unfortunately, these early models got stuck into the limited mod-
eling techniques of that time and did not succeed to endogenize tech-
nological development and diﬀusion. The interest in long run growth
modeling waned, all the more in the context of growth deceleration in
the 1970s. Only by the 1980s, macro-economists renewed their interest
in long run growth modeling and along with this, in its empirical foun-
dations. The mainstream literature has now endogenized technological
progress, enabling economists to explain the economic-historical obser-
vations of persistent growth diﬀerences and leapfrogging (Sections 2.4.1
to 2.4.3). Meanwhile, an alternative strand in the literature, evolution-
ary growth theory, developed almost independently (Section 2.4.4). The
criticism of evolutionary economists of endogenous growth theory forces
mainstream economists to pay more explicit attention to divergence,
uncertainty, tacit knowledge and institutions. The modern growth the-
ories boosted the building of new data sets and the growth regression
literature on the impact of innovation and diﬀusion (Section 2.4.5).
After discussing these various strands in the growth literature, I
shortly summarize how the issue of international technology diﬀusion
is embedded in this literature, and how the diﬀerent strands can be tied
together (Section 2.5).
2.2 Comparative historical analysis of
technology and growth
Long before formal growth theories assimilated issues like economies of
scale, endogenous innovation and diﬀusion, economic historians and stu-
dents of the history of technology dealt with these issues. Historically
oriented economists tackled the issue of how and why countries or in-
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dustries grow.2 The literature is extensive and does not always show a
clear direction of new thinking. Therefore, I do not discuss the liter-
ature in a strict chronological order, but focus on the main topics of
economic-historical analysis, each with their own major concepts.
Catching up The concept of catching up is central to much of the
economic-historical literature on economic growth of Western economies.
Basically, it states that a ‘follower’ country tends to converge on a
‘leader’ country in terms of the latter’s productivity level (Abramovitz,
1991, p.44). A follower experiences a technology gap with the leader,
because it initially uses an average technology while the leader is at the
technology frontier and exploits ‘best practices’ with higher productiv-
ity. The larger the gap, the larger the potential to catch up will be, as
this potential will create incentives to catch up. The concept is strongly
linked to the idea of Gerschenkron (1962) on the ‘advantages of back-
wardness’. The gap creates a scope for imitation or absorption of the
leader’s technology. It does not only concern the replacement of obsolete
capital by the best-practice technology. It also provides the opportunity
to adopt additional knowledge surrounding the leading technology, such
as management practices, educational improvements and institutional
innovations (Abramovitz, 1991).
Path dependency However, catching up in productivity is not the
same as catching up in technology (Broadberry, 1994a). The former does
not necessarily mean that follower countries also increasingly resemble
the leader in terms of the actual technology used. The leader’s technology
may diﬀuse to the follower, but the follower does not simply imitate.
Instead the latter adapts the inherent knowledge to its own ‘technology
regime’, which then progresses on its own ‘path’. A technology regime
or system is determined by the prevailing technology practices, factor
proportions and market conditions.
The Habakkuk debate on the emergence of the US as an economic
power in the nineteenth century led to this division between catching
up in productivity and catching up in technology. Why and how did
the United States catch up with the former economic leader, the United
Kingdom? The thesis of Habakkuk (1962) states that because of rela-
tive labour scarcity, the nineteenth century American economy devel-
2A part of their work is supported by historical growth accounts which are dis-
cussed in Section 2.3.4.
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oped capital-intensive mass production technologies in agriculture and
manufacturing.3 This capital-intensive technology was superior in pro-
ductivity levels, and enabled the American economy to forge ahead of
the UK in the late nineteenth century.
Temin (1966, 1971) objected against the idea of relative labour scarc-
ity in US manufacturing. Since US interest rates were high at that time,
capital was scarce, implying a lower capital intensity in manufacturing
than in the UK, given that the two countries had common access to
the same technologies. Temins argument became known as the labour
scarcity paradox (compared to UK manufacturing, US manufacturing
had a lower capital intensity but higher labour productivity).
Other historians responded to the paradox by suggesting that ex-
planations might be found at industry level. First, only a number of
industries developed capital intensive technologies, often due to comple-
mentarity with natural resources (Ames and Rosenberg, 1968; David,
1975; Cain and Paterson, 1985). Second, James and Skinner (1985) ar-
gue that capital substituted for (scarce) skilled labour. Industries which
needed skilled labourers developed capital-intensive skilled labour-saving
technology. These industries produced only 7% of US manufacturing out-
put in 1850. Therefore the overall capital intensity in US manufacturing
was comparatively low. Finally, Broadberry (1997b) argues that Ameri-
can mass production techniques could not be successfully applied at the
same time in all industries.
Field (1985) argues that contemporary British visitors to US man-
ufacturing industries used machinery intensity as a measure for capital
intensity. But machinery is only a part of the total capital stock, which
also consists of non-residential structures. The share of machinery in the
capital stock was smaller in the US than in the UK. Total capital stocks
constructed by Field reveals that by 1860, the US were less capital in-
tensive than the UK, both in the overall economy and in manufacturing.
Maddison (2001) and O’Rourke and Williamson (2000) argue that a
major source of catching up of the US to the UK level is not necessarily
only capital accumulation but also international technology diﬀusion.
However, this also raises the question why the early twentieth century
UK did not catch up with the US, despite diﬀusion in the opposite
direction.
Finally, David (1975) developed a model of path dependent develop-
3This is properly called the Habakkuk-Rothbarth thesis, also giving Rothbarth
(1948) some of the credits.
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ment, elaborated by Broadberry (1994a). A country initially chooses a
technology which ﬁts its factor proportions and market conditions.4 Over
time, subsequent investments bring about a cumulation of experience
with this technology, which may even cause increasing returns to scale.
The technology becomes increasingly embedded in the economy. As tech-
nology progresses, the economy will develop along a ‘growth path’ with
more or less ﬁxed factor proportions. Within boundaries, techniques may
be replaced by each other. However, the country will not easily switch
to a fundamentally diﬀerent technology system, as the costs of such a
switch will generally be too high.5 As long as a follower country adjusts
the leader’s technology to its own technology system so that its produc-
tivity can continue to catch up with the leader’s productivity, the two
systems can coexist.
Technology congruence and social capability Why do countries
not succeed to catch up in productivity, or even fall behind? In the search
for an answer, Abramovitz’ (1991) concepts of technology congruence
and social capability come in particularly useful.
Technology congruence is the extent to which a follower country’s
factor proportions, nature and state of technology, and market condi-
tions ﬁt with the leader’s technology characteristics (Abramovitz, 1991,
p.45). This determines how easily the leader’s technology may ﬂow into
the follower’s economy and be embedded in production, or how costly it
is for the follower to absorb foreign leader technology. Comparative ad-
vantage may impose restrictions on such international diﬀusion of tech-
nology.
Social capability (or technology competence) determines the abil-
ity to innovate and to absorb technology from elsewhere, and to adopt
and adapt it to local circumstances. The literature gives very mixed
and broad deﬁnitions of this concept. Three key forces are repeatedly
mentioned, though. These forces are culture, government policy and in-
stitutions.
These factors are among other things the country’s level and type
of human capital, research institutions, ﬁnancial institutions, attitudes,
4The country does not operate just one technique, but an array of techniques
which resemble each other in the proportion of factors of production used, and which
are dominant in most sectors of the economy.
5If factor proportions and market conditions change fundamentally, switching costs
might decrease. For instance, post-war period conditions diﬀer substantially from the
late nineteenth century circumstances.
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policy and organisation of the economy.6 Policy as such actually does not
provide absorptive capacity, though it may aﬀect this capacity. Culture,
reﬂected in social customs, traditions, norms and religions, is usually
considered as quite elusive by economists. It only changes over a very
long run, taking centuries (Williamson, 2000). Institutions and organi-
sations may change within less than a century. In contrast to culture, it
is possible to reform some institutions and organisations intentionally.
Technology congruence and social capability together determine the
potential to catch up in the medium term. Realisation of the poten-
tial depends among other things on actual investment decisions of ﬁrms
and individuals, educational organisations and the current engagement
of government in innovation. Technology gap opportunities by them-
selves are self-limited in nature, as catching up decreases opportunities.
However, in the long run, catch up opportunities change because the
technology leader progresses. Moreover, technology systems and social
capability gradually change, under the inﬂuence of actions of the same
ﬁrms, individuals and organisations. This also changes the potential to
catch up for followers.
Finally, the concept of a potential of ‘latent knowledge’ might explain
why a follower country may ultimately succeed to surpass a leader, such
as the nineteenth century US did (Abramovitz, 1991, p.43-44). Latent
knowledge is frontier knowledge which is still non-existent but which
may be developed. Some directions of technological progress may bear a
larger potential of latent knowledge than other directions. It may happen
that at a certain point of time, the most fruitful directions of technolog-
ical progress ﬁt well with a country’s resource and factor endowments,
market size, scale in production and other factors. Then a country may
advance rapidly, depending on its scientiﬁc, engineering and administra-
tive eﬀorts. Nineteenth century US probably succeeded to reap such a po-
tential of ‘latent knowledge’ in capital-intensive technology (Abramovitz
and David 1973; Chandler, 1990).
These concepts point to a number of elements relevant for international
technology diﬀusion. First, absorption of foreign leading technology ap-
6Social capability shows some overlap with the concept of social capital. However,
social capital is a kind of asset, which like physical and human capital, can be accu-
mulated, replaced and rented. Social capital is an asset of informal social rights which
an agent acquires by investing in his social network. Its accumulation creates trust,
norms and networks which improve eﬃciency through coordinated actions (Putnam,
1993).
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pears not to be costless, nor automatic or inevitable (Gerschenkron,
1962; Abramovitz, 1991; Broadberry, 1997b). Second, absorption capac-
ity partially depends on a follower country’s own eﬀorts. Free riding on
the leader’s technology is not possible. This is not only because simple
copying of the leader’s technology is unproductive for the follower’s econ-
omy given diﬀerences in factor proportions and market conditions. It is
also because adapting the leader’s technology requires an understanding
of the involved knowledge. This understanding is likely to be gained by
means of own research eﬀorts or human capital accumulation. Third,
technology diﬀusion is uneven across countries and industries, depend-
ing on their technology congruence and capabilities. Fourth, technology
diﬀusion is typically slow. If a country lacks technology congruence or
falls short of capability to adopt, diﬀusion will be a long process. Fi-
nally, catching up in technology will not necessarily lead to catching up
in productivity. Countries diﬀer in their technology systems and social
capability. Absorption of foreign technology implies adjustment of this
technology to the local circumstances. The embeddedness of the tech-
nology in production will determine its productivity.
Endogenous innovation and diﬀusion Technology congruence and
social capability determine how ﬁrms and individuals react to their en-
vironment and to international technology spillovers from abroad. Early
micro-economic studies on technology diﬀusion show how costs and ben-
eﬁts of innovation and acquiring new knowledge determine innovation
and diﬀusion.
Griliches (1957) looked at the adoption and diﬀusion of hybrid corn
(a new agricultural ‘technology’) within and across US regions. He ob-
tained an S-shaped diﬀusion curve based on a regression with data for
US regions. Cross-region diﬀerences in the timing of adoption, rate of ac-
ceptance (the slope of the curve) and the equilibrium level of acceptance
(the ceiling of the curve) are explained by diﬀerences in how proﬁtable
it is to shift to hybrid corn.
Schmookler (1966) and Mansﬁeld (1968) also found evidence for the
S-shaped diﬀusion curve at industry level. They also found that indus-
tries diﬀer in the timing and rate of diﬀusion. Schmookler (1966) ﬁnds
a high correlation between industrial spending on R&D and patent ap-
plications of the ﬁrms which made these expenditures. He stressed that
inventions were determined by demand conditions. Saturation weighs
more heavily than diminishing marginal returns to inventive activity,
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because investments are only made if they are proﬁtable or expected
to be so. On the supply side, technologies to produce the desired prod-
ucts are just selected out a pool of possible technologies, which diﬀer
across industries. Mansﬁeld (1968), in contrast, emphasizes that both
supply and demand forces are important. A new technology has to be
both technically and economically feasible. He concludes that the rate of
diﬀusion increases if innovations do not replace very durable equipment
and if the industry is growing rapidly. This appears to be consistent with
the hypothesis that rates of diﬀusion are higher in industries with more
competition.
These early studies point to the restrictions of econometric work and
data constraints (Griliches, 1992, 1994). Measurement problems concern-
ing productivity and technology are numerous. For instance, total pro-
ductivity is used as a proxy for technological change, which is a rather
indirect measure. Total productivity captures other factors in addition
to technological change, including measurement errors. Direct measures
for capital, R&D and patents have their own restrictions. For instance,
R&D statistics do not capture many small ﬁrms which do not regis-
ter their innovative eﬀort. Not all inventions are patented, the quality
of inventions is not measured, and there are interindustry diﬀerences
in the propensity to patent. Furthermore, assumptions made in regres-
sion analysis on technology and growth are not always realistic, includ-
ing the neutrality of technological change, the absence of economies of
scale, or disembodiment of technological change. Moreover, the regres-
sions assume causality. And without an underlying growth theory, the
implications of the micro-economic studies cannot be translated to the
macro-economic level.
Shortcomings of the economic-historical literature “In econo-
mic history, more so perhaps than in other disciplines, everything is a
matter of degree, and there are no absolutes” (Mokyr, 2005, p.75). This
statement may capture a major problem of a large part of the economic-
historical literature. Causal relationships are often not made explicit
or formalized, possibly except for the cliometrics movement. Any sup-
posed relationship often remains fuzzy because various feedback eﬀects
are mentioned, which blur the direction of the causation. This literature
indeed points to the relative importance of certain forces behind interna-
tional technology diﬀusion, such as institutions. It clearly demonstrates
the relationship of these forces with economic growth, which are diﬃcult
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to capture in a formal growth model. However, the economic-historical
literature is relatively descriptive compared to formal theory, and does
not always force to be explicit about the assumptions, direction and
weight in causal relationships.
2.3 Early modeling and empirics
In the 1950s and 1960s, the ﬁrst theoretical macro-economic growth
models emerged which paid attention to technological progress and hu-
man capital (Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). Of all these models, the neoclassi-
cal Solow model with technological progress has been the most inﬂuen-
tial. Meanwhile, the neoclassical theory has continued to compete with
Keynesian theory (Section 2.3.3). But the Solow model has typically be-
come the starting point for the empirical analysis of growth, in particular
for the emerging growth accounting literature (Section 2.3.4).
2.3.1 The Solow model with technology
Solow (1956) assumed fully disembodied, exogenous technological pro-
gress to explain sustained growth in the neoclassical framework.7 He
described technological progress as labour augmenting, using the sim-
ple aggregate production function Yt = F (Kt, AtLt), where output Y
depends on technological change At, capital Kt and labour Lt.8 Assum-
ing the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, this can
be rewritten as Yt/Lt = yt = F (kt, At), where kt is the capital-labour
ratio. In the steady state, growth of yt is constant, so the average prod-
uct of capital yt/kt = f(At/kt) should be constant (ceteris paribus).
Technology At increases exponentially at a rate x. To keep the average
product of capital constant, kt should grow at the same rate.9 That is,
the capital-labour ratio is not constant in the long run. When deﬁning
the capital per eﬀective unit of labour as k˜t = kt/At = Kt/(AtLt), out-
put per eﬀective unit of labour can be written as y˜t = yt/At = f(k˜t). The
growth rate of capital per eﬀective unit of labour,assuming depreciation
7Properly called the Solow-Swan model, as it is also named after Swan (1956),
who independently developed a comparable growth model.
8Harrod neutrality implies that relative input shares remain unchanged for a given
capital-labour ratio. With Hicks neutrality, where Yt = At F (Kt, Lt), the ratio of
the marginal products of capital and labour remains constant. In the Cobb-Douglas




t , Hicks and Harrod neutrality give the same results.
9Assuming zero population growth.
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where s is the savings rate. In the steady state, where dk˜t/dt = 0, capital
and output per eﬀective unit of labour remains constant, but capital and
output per worker (or labour productivity) grow at rate x in the long
run. An increase in technology At namely raises the marginal product
of capital, stimulating investment.
Convergence An important prediction of the Solow model is that a
country’s per capita growth rate decreases when it approaches the steady
state, due to diminishing returns to capital. A country with a low ini-
tial k˜t will grow faster than a country with a higher initial k˜t. This
phenomenon is named β-convergence. β-convergence thus occurs when
the partial correlation between real per capita income growth and its
initial level is negative (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). β-convergence
is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for σ-convergence, which re-
ﬂects falling dispersion of real per capital income across countries (Quah,
1993).
There is also a distinction between absolute β-convergence and con-
ditional β-convergence. Absolute convergence implies that countries will
end up with the same steady state value of k˜∗. If, however, countries dif-
fer in technology, savings or other parameters in the accumulation equa-
tion, then the resulting steady state values of income may diﬀer across
these countries. In Figure 2.1, a ‘poor’ country starts with a lower cap-
ital stock k˜0 than a ‘rich’ country. The poor country ends up at a lower
steady state value k˜∗ than the rich country, because their parameter val-
ues diﬀer. In the following text, and in the next chapters of this thesis,
the term ‘convergence’ refers to conditional β-convergence.
An implication of the Solow model for an open economy environment
is that if capital is mobile, rich countries will invest in poor countries
where capital-labour ratios are low and marginal returns to investments
are high.
The Solow residual Solow (1957) used the production function with
Harrod neutral technological progress, Yt = At F (Kt, Lt), to decompose
output growth into the diﬀerent contributions of capital, labour and
2.3. Early modeling and empirics 19
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or, in intensive form, assuming constant returns to scale and thereby










The term (dAt/dt)/At is the so called Solow residual.10 More formally, it
is Total Factor Productivity (TFP) or Multi Factor Productivity (MFP)
growth. Solow labeled the residual ‘technical change’ for convenience,
but at the same time emphasized that it could contain other factors,
such as ”slowdowns, speed ups, improvements in the education of the
10The correct term should be the Abramovitz residual, following Abramovitz’ ear-
lier work in 1956.
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labor force, and all sort of things”, not in the least measurement er-
rors (Solow, 1957, p.402). In an empirical application to American data,
Solow found that capital accumulation accounted for less than one ﬁfth
of the doubling of output during the period 1909-1949. Total factor pro-
ductivity growth ‘explained’ the remainder.
Shortcomings of the Solow model An important shortcoming of
the Solow model is that in the steady state, additional savings do not
matter for growth of per capita income, and that technological progress
does do all the work (assuming zero population growth). This is rather
counterintuitive, as capital is an important complementary factor, which
also appears from the economic-historical literature. Moreover, the mo-
del implicitly states that technology is freely accessible for all countries
so that cross-country growth rates of technology are equal in the long
run. The model also exhibits a quick and smooth adjustment to the
long run growth path. That is, new knowledge spreads immediately.
However, transition is actually rather slow, even over half a century as
empiricists already showed in the 1960s. In the meantime, economies are
continuously confronted with shocks. Furthermore, empirical evidence
shows that capital and technology alone cannot explain the magnitude
of cross-country growth diﬀerences. Other forces seem to claim a role in
this neoclassical model, such as human capital.11
The major deﬁciency of the Solow model in the context of techno-
logical progress is that it does not explain how disembodied technolog-
ical progress originates. New technology falls like ‘manna from heaven’.
Within the neoclassical framework, one could also develop a model with
all new technology embodied in capital, such as Solow’s (1962) vintage
model. But such a model still does not explain the origins of new knowl-
edge in the new vintages.
2.3.2 Human capital models
Human capital theory has traditional roots in the economic literature,
developed by among others Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964). Human
capital may accumulate in two ways: through learning-by-doing and
through education. But it may be not the accumulation, but the stock
11See Section 2.4.5 on empirical application by Mankiw et al. (1992) of the Solow
model augmented with human capital.
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of human capital that determines the capacity of an economy to develop
and absorb new technology.
Learning by doing Arrow (1962) ascribed technical change to the
eﬀects of experience of workers in production, or learning by doing.
Learning is not just a repetition of actions in production, but results
in a steadily evolving pool of experience. Experience can be measured
by investment because new equipment changes the environment, with
new stimuli (Arrow, 1962, p.157). Investment aﬀects production via ex-
perience in three ways: capital accumulation, embodiment of techno-
logical advances in the latest vintages, and stimulation of innovation.
Innovation generates externalities causing a divergence between social
and private returns to innovation. The new knowledge is a public good,
and the market does not compensate the innovator. The accumulation
of knowledge is an unintentional by-product of the accumulation of cap-
ital. The state of knowledge A depends on the total capital stock k or




where 0 < η < 1 is a technical parameter. kt is given for an individ-
ual ﬁrm. Aggregate production (assuming the individual ﬁrms are all
representative and aggregating their outputs) is described as (following
Sala-i-Martin, 1990, p.18)





This implies constant returns to both Kt and Lt with a given kt, but
increasing returns to all inputs. In intensive form, the production func-
tion becomes yt = kαt k
η
t . Sala-i-Martin (1990) shows that the case in
which α+η < 1 results in a zero long run growth rate. Hence, increasing
returns by themselves are not suﬃcient to generate persistent growth.
Productivity growth might be constant if the growth rate of cumulative
investment is constant.
Education Uzawa (1965) developed a two-sector model, with a pro-
duction sector and an education sector. In this model, a part of the
human capital is not used in production but is accumulated in the ed-
ucation sector. The cross-country diﬀerences in labour eﬃciency A and
thus growth are due to diﬀerences in the growth rate of human capital
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accumulation. This model, however, implies that education, or the accu-
mulation of human capital, will always have a positive eﬀect on economic
growth.
An alternative is to consider the stock of human capital as input.
Nelson and Phelps (1966) wrote a short paper on the signiﬁcance of the
stock of human capital for the absorption capacity and technological
catching up of countries. In fact, they formalized the catching up concept
proposed by Gerschenkron (1962). The rate at which the gap between
the technology frontier and the current level of productivity is narrowed
depends on the level of human capital. Disembodied knowledge ﬂows
from the leader to the followers. But the smaller the distance to the
leader, the slower the catching up growth will be. Formally (following
Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005)
dAt/dt
At







where (dAt/dt)/dAt is TFP growth, g(Ht) the component of TFP growth
depending on the level of education (or human capital stock) Ht in the
country, and c(Ht)(Aˆt/At − 1) the rate of technology diﬀusion from the
leader to the country. Ht aﬀects the rate at which the gap Aˆt/At is
closed. The leader has a higher human capital level. Technology diﬀusion
is exponential, in that countries exhibit positive catching up with the
leader. Despite scale aﬀects and diﬀerences in human capital levels, all
countries will eventually grow at the same rate. Divergent growth paths
are not explained within this framework.
2.3.3 Heterodox economics
The Solow model was an alternative growth model to the Keynesian
growth model of Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946). In the Harrod-Domar
model, sustained positive growth is only achieved by chance, because the
parameters which determine equilibrium are given. The natural growth
rate (the sum of the population growth rate and the rate of technological
progress) deviates nearly always from the warranted growth rate, the
rate at which a growth path is guaranteed. The steady state is not
necessarily stable, in contrast to the neoclassical result. Moreover, the
capital-output ratio K/Y is constant, so that long run output growth
depends on investments via savings. In the neoclassical model, this is
certainly not the case.
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Post-Keynesians like Kaldor (1961) and Robinson (1965) rejected the
neoclassical framework with exogenous technological progress and sepa-
rable production factors. They stated the factors of production are not
perfect substitutable, and that the price mechanism does not work per-
fectly. Kaldor (1961), for instance, assumed that the savings rate depends
on the functional income distribution between capital and labour, and
that savings themselves are a linear function of technological progress. If
the savings rate is fully dependent on capital income, then the K/Y ra-
tio is constant. Then just one production technique exists and the saving
rate depends on the returns on capital. In the neoclassical model, the
marginal productivity of the factors of production K and L are equal
to their factor prices. Therefore, a change in the real wage rate, proﬁt
rate or prices lead to a change in the capital intensity K/L, which in
turn changes K/Y . In the Keynesian model, only price changes lead to
a change in the savings rate.
Meanwhile, the neoclassical scholars extended the standard Solow
model. For instance, Samuelson (1958) laid a microfoundation for the
macro-economic model. The two-sector model of Meade (1961) is a
straightforward extension of the Solow model. One result of Meade’s
explorations is that the growth path may be indeterminate because the
equilibrium is not unique. Models with vintages in capital equipment
took into account embodied technological change (Solow, 1962). The-
ories of the savings behaviour were developed by among others Cass
(1965) and Koopmans (1965). Tobin (1965) combined real eﬀects with
monetary phenomena. Unfortunately, these models did not succeed to
endogenize technological progress.
2.3.4 Growth accounting
Meanwhile, much empirical work on growth was done by growth accoun-
tants. This literature originally arose from the policy needs for empirical
evidence on the contribution of the accumulation of factors of production
to economic growth as measured in national accounts. Kuznets (1965),
the NBER in the US, and Tinbergen (1942) in the Netherlands did much
pioneering work in constructing growth accounts for several countries.
The Solow model became the starting point for decomposing output
growth into the contributions of production factors, though most growth
accountants applied this framework in a pragmatic way. They aimed to
reduce the large Solow residual, which was called the ‘measure of our
ignorance’ (Abramovitz, 1991).
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Reducing the Solow residual There are various ways to reduce
the Solow residual, which may interact. First, the residual is partially
reduced by accounting not only for the quantity of the factors of produc-
tion, capital and labour, but also for quality improvements. A new vin-
tage may contain new, better technology; newly hired labour may have
a higher level of education, skills or experience. Solow (1957) shows that
the residual explained 87.5% of American output growth between 1909
and 1949 (Table 2.1). But Abramovitz (1956) argues that accounting for
quality improvements in capital might reduce the residual. What appears
to be part of the shift in the production function (i.e. disembodied tech-
nological change) might actually be accumulation of real capital. During
the 1950s, Fabricant (1954), Abramovitz (1956) and Kendrick (1956) are
the most inﬂuential scholars who measure the changes in quantity and
quality of capital and labour.
Table 2.1: Growth accounts of the United States (annual growth rates,
between brackets: percentage of output growth explained by variable)
Solow Denison Jorgenson/ Kendrick Maddison
Griliches
1957 1967 1972 1976 1991
Period 1909-1949 1950-1962 1950-162 1929-1969 1950-1973
Output 1.71 (100) 2.15 (100) 3.47 (100) 3.40 (100) 3.65 (100)
... Labour hours -0.17 (-8) 0.37 (11) 0.81 (22)
... Labour quality 0.39 (18) 0.34 (10) 0.35 (10)
Total labour input 0.22 (10) 0.71 (20) 1.45 (43) 1.17 (32)
... Capital stock 0.60 (28) 1.30 (37) 0.98 (27)
... Capital quality 0.41 (12) 0.39 (11)
Total capital input 0.60 (28) 1.38 (49) 1.38 (41) 1.38 (38)
Total capital and labour input 0.21 (12) 0.79 (37) 2.42 (70) 2.83 (83) 2.54 (70)
Total factor productivity 1.50 (88) 1.36 (63) 1.03 (30) 0.57 (17) 1.11 (30)
Unexplained 1.50 (88) 0.76 (34) 1.03 (30) 0.57 (17) 0.77 (21)
Additional sources like foreign trade eﬀects, economies of scale and demand ﬂuctuations
account for the diﬀerence between total factor productivity and the unexplained residual in
the national accounts of Denison (1967) and Maddison (1991). Note: Denison (1967) adjusted
total factor input for land (-0.03 per cent per year). Maddisons data (1991, Table 5.3 and
5.10) are weighted with 0.7 for total labour input (growth rate 1.67), 0.23 for non-residential
capital (growth rate 5.01) and 0.07 for residential capital stock (growth rate 3.29).
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Second, the growth residual decreases further by accounting for more
‘proximate sources’ of growth besides capital, labour and human capital
(see Table 2.2).12 An important step forward, in particular for interna-
tionally comparable growth accounts, is made by Denison (1962, 1967).
He introduces various new ‘sources of growth’ for the US and some Euro-
pean countries, such as improved allocation in resources and economies
of scale. Still, 34% of output growth in the US between 1950 and 1962
remains to be explained (Table 2.1). According to Denison, advances
in knowledge or general eﬃciency are diﬃcult to measure directly. He
argues that the residual contains these eﬃciency changes and disem-
bodied technological change. Furthermore, it includes changes in the lag
in the application of knowledge, and the interaction between the forces
contained in the residual. Finally, the residual captures all measurement
errors and omissions. Kendrick (1976, 1993) adds R&D to the traditional
inputs, and reduces the residual further to 17% of output growth (Table
2.1). Maddison (1995a) also constructs accounts for a large number of
countries. His residual accounts for less than 30% of US growth in the
Golden Age period. For the period 1973-1987, he explains even 94% of
output growth. For European countries, he calculates an explained part
of more than two third (in most cases) since 1913.
Table 2.2: Maddison: Potential sources of growth
Proximate sources of growth Accumulation of physical capital
Accumulation of human capital and crude labour




Market structure and resources allocation
Economies of scale
Macroeconomic conditions and demand ﬂuctuations
Measurement errors and non-measurable factors
Ultimate sources of growth Government policy
Social changes
Institutional and structural change
12Maddison’s (1991) ‘proximate’ and ‘ultimate’ sources of growth resemble the con-
cepts of technology congruence and social capability respectively (see Section 2.2).
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Finally, measurement errors may also account for a part of the resid-
ual. Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) allege that Denison and other growth
accountants faced serious measurement errors, which they aimed to
‘eliminate’, such as errors in aggregation, investment good prices, rel-
ative utilization, and aggregation of capital and labour services (Jorgen-
son, 1995, Table 3.9, p.84). Hence, following Jorgenson and Griliches,
US output growth between 1945 and 1965 appears to be nearly fully
explained by input growth, leaving a TFP residual of only 3% of out-
put growth. Following a debate with Denison, Jorgenson and Griliches
ﬁnally concluded that they had exaggerated the reduction of the the
role of total factor productivity. Later calculations by Jorgenson and
Griliches (1972) show the residual contributes 30% to output growth
between 1950 and 1962, still lower than Denison’s outcome (Table 2.1).
Historical and sectoral accounts Growth accounts have also con-
tributed to growth analysis beyond post-war advanced economies at the
macro-economic level. For instance, Maddison (2003) composed long
run, internationally comparable time series on output, population, la-
bour, capital and exports for a large group of countries across the world,
generally from 1820 onwards. Long run, historical growth accounts en-
able economic-historical researchers to quantitatively assess the contri-
butions of various factors behind growth. Therefore, the link between
historical growth accounting and economic-historical literature is quite
strong. Main scholars combining these two strands in the literature are,
among others, Broadberry (1997b), Crafts (2003a), Abramovitz (1993)
and David (1991).
Their calculations reveal that in the nineteenth century, capital ac-
cumulation, which in some cases is assumed to include embodied non-
neutral technological progress, played a relatively large role in labour
productivity growth. In the twentieth century, however, the role of total
factor productivity growth increased (Abramovitz, 1993). The histori-
cal accounts also show that countries do not always follow converging
growth paths or catch up. Rather, before 1870, divergence was more
common, and between 1870 and the Second World War only weak con-
vergence was found (Maddison, 2001). In the Golden Age between 1950
and 1973, catching up and convergence was strong within a club of ad-
vanced capitalist countries, but again divergence was the rule for the
world as a whole.
Another important contribution of the growth accounting litera-
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ture is the systematic decomposition of aggregate growth and factor
inputs to the sectoral level, by among others Jorgenson (1995), Kendrick
(1976), Maddison and Van Ark (1994) and Broadberry (1997b). In 1960,
Salter already emphasized the importance of a sectoral approach. Macro-
economic growth may not unveil heterogeneity across countries in spe-
cialization and the accompanying technological progress and diﬀusion,
thereby presenting a too simple picture of how and why countries diﬀer in
growth experience. Sectoral shifts (or structural changes) over time are
key to macro-economic performance (Van Ark, 1996). Depending on the
nature of technological change (capital-deepening or labour-intensive) in
the various sectors, sectoral factor intensities and prices might change,
shifting inputs from lower- to higher-productivity sectors. International
mobility and technology diﬀusion may mitigate such sectoral shifts, but
country-speciﬁc eﬀects remain very important too. Studies have shown
that in the nineteenth century, high-productivity manufacturing played
a dominant role in US growth, whereas services were relatively impor-
tant in the UK. This suggests diﬀerent technology regimes and path
dependent developments (Broadberry, 1997a). Many post-war Western
European economies experienced a shift to the service sector (Crafts and
Toniolo, 1996).
Recent developments With the revival of growth theory in the 1980s
(see Section 2.4), the issue of accounting explicitly for technological
change and diﬀusion has come more to the forefront. For instance, es-
timation of the elasticity of substitution between factors of production
and its impact on growth allows for increasing returns to scale due to
innovation. Allowing for changes over time in the shares of factors of
production in output gives room to non-neutral changes in eﬃciency.
Hence, the ‘modern’ growth regressions provide a link between endoge-
nous growth theory and growth accounts (Jorgenson, 1995). Still, growth
accounts help to account for variables used in growth regressions, and
can provide evidence of ‘overexplanation’ of growth, for instance because
of interactions between the variables (Maddison, 1995a, p.13). Another
recent issue is the measurement of the more elusive ‘ultimate sources of
growth’, such as changes in institutions, policy and society (Maddison,
1991; Crafts and Toniolo, 1996). Growth accounts traditionally estimate
proximate sources only.
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Limitations of growth accounting The Solovian framework is a
good starting point for quantitative growth analysis, but the subsequent
reﬁned decomposition depends on the data construction and the under-
lying assumptions. A main limitation of the growth accounts is that they
do not explain the origin of the sources of growth. They do not explain
diﬀerences in technological progress over time and levels of capital stocks
between countries. Moreover, growth accounts do not always assimilate
the insights of modern growth theory (see Section 2.4); this requires
more laborious and econometric work such as the estimation of elastic-
ity of substitution (Crafts, 2003b). Finally, accounting for technological
change and diﬀusion still does not go far beyond the measurement of
(domestic and foreign) R&D and patenting. Particularly for the service
sector, this measurement issue is relatively important (Griliches, 1992).
Growth accounts provide much empirical evidence on growth and its
‘sources’. The revival of growth theory boosted the data construction by
growth accountants. It also put more emphasis on the need too collect
data on technology. Data sets were designed, constructed and extended
(see, for instance, Maddison, 2003). Growth accountants also reﬁned the
methods and procedures for constructing internationally comparable ac-
counts (see, for instance, Inklaar et al., 2005). In turn, these data provide
growth theorists the opportunity to test their theories with growth re-
gressions.
2.4 Modern growth theory and empirics
Since the mid-1980s, economists regained interest in the explanation of
long run growth and cross-country growth diﬀerences. Conditional β-
convergence had not taken place and the exogeneity of technological
progress in the Solow model was unsatisfactory. Moreover, an inﬂuen-
tial empirical study based on the Solow model by Mankiw et al. (1992)
had shown that convergence does not take place without accounting for
diﬀerences in human capital. From the late 1980s onwards, new neo-
classical growth models were developed which attempted to endogenize
technological progress (Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2). In this framework, in-
ternational technology diﬀusion and its costs and eﬀects received more
and more attention (Section 2.4.3). Meanwhile, evolutionary growth the-
ory developed along the mainstream theory (Section 2.4.4). Some Post-
Keynesians also constructed modern growth models. On the empirical
side, much work was done by growth regression studies (Section 2.4.5),
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stimulated by expanding databases such as the PennWorld Tables (Sum-
mers and Heston, 1991) and datasets on science and technology statistics
from international organisations like the OECD. The increasing avail-
ability of data ultimately pushed the empirical testing and subsequent
development of the new growth models forward.13
2.4.1 Endogenizing growth
Modern endogenous growth theory in the neoclassical tradition emerged
from a number of studies which attempted to avoid diminishing returns
to capital. They did so by assuming externalities from capital accumu-
lation.
Constant returns to capital The most direct approach to endoge-
nize growth in the neoclassical framework is a model with reproducible
capital goods which generate long run growth. This follows the view that
non-reproducible factors are not a key variable in the long run growth
(Rebelo, 1991, p.518). In the 1980s and early 1990s, some models were
developed in which the production function exhibits constant returns to
inputs that can be accumulated (CRIA). An example is the AK-model
of Rebelo (1991). In this model, the aggregate production function is
perceived as Yt = AtKt, that is, there are constant returns to capi-
tal.14 The AK-model is a partial return to the Harrod-Domar model
where marginal productivity of capital is also constant. In contrast to
the Harrod-Domar model, however, labour supply is no bottleneck in
the AK-model (Solow, 1994).
The AK-model has not become popular, as the assumption of con-
stant returns to capital was not supported by empirical evidence, and
the evolution of technology A remained unexplained. If nonreproducible
inputs are necessary for growth, then increasing returns to scale (IRTS)
arise.15 However, a problem with such IRTS models is that no general
equilibrium will result, because the increasing returns imply unlimited
proﬁts to production. Other models were developed to solve this prob-
13Meanwhile economists also developed modern models using the ideas of both the
old Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model and the modern endogenous growth theory; see
for instance Heijdra and Van der Ploeg (2002). However, such analyses of savings
behaviour and intertemporal choices are outside the scope of this thesis.
14In a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale (α+β = 1),
the capital share α equals one.
15In the Cobb-Douglas case, α + β > 1.
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lem, such as model that incorporate knowledge spillovers (Romer, 1986)
and rejection of perfect competition (Romer, 1990).
Knowledge externalities Romer (1986) modeled growth propelled
by competition among ﬁrms investing in knowledge creation. While indi-
vidual ﬁrms face diminishing returns to investment in knowledge, at the
level of the economy as a whole increasing returns to knowledge emerge
in production. This externality is due to unintentional Arrovian learning
eﬀects in production via the accumulation of capital (see Section 2.3.2).
Entrepreneurs take the resulting national pool of knowledge as given and
exploit this in production. The diﬀerence with the original Arrow (1962)
model is that Romer assumed that the externalities from knowledge via
capital accumulation compensate for the diminishing returns to capital
(Romer, 1986, p.1016). In fact, this means that α + η = 1 in Equation
(2.5), in which case the model turns into an AK-like model. However,
in contrast to the AK-model, knowledge accumulates with capital. The
accumulators of capital do not earn a return on the accumulated knowl-
edge, and the new knowledge is freely available.
Romer (1986) uses a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) variant of the production
function with product varieties or intermediates xi in a continuum [0,A].





with 0 < α < 1. In symmetric equilibrium, xi = x for all types of i. The
value of x is the result of equating marginal cost of developing knowledge
with (only) capital and marginal revenue from demand, or the marginal
product of the intermediates. There is free entry into the intermediate
goods sector, so that proﬁts are zero. This determines the equilibrium
value of A, the knowledge or technology level. The aggregate production
function in the Romer (1986) model is then





with coeﬃcient b > 0. There are, in principle, IRTS in Lt and Kt. How-
ever, if α = 1, the model is an AK-like model. Moreover, diminishing
returns to capital are still possible (Sala-i-Martin, 1990). Furthermore,
the free entry into the intermediate sector does not yield temporary
monopoly proﬁt for ﬁrms doing research. However, if technology dif-
fusion spreads only gradually, the assumption of perfect competition
breaks down.
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Human capital externalities Lucas’ (1988) model is also an AK-
like model, but here K is deﬁned broadly, including both physical and
human capital. In contrast to the Romer model, the learning process is
intentional. The economy in Lucas’ model consists of two sectors, one
for production and one for education. In the Arrow model, knowledge
was generated in production, whereas in the Lucas model human cap-
ital accumulates by means of education in leisure time. Lucas applied
Uzawa’s (1965) assumption that the existing human capital is the only
input in the education sector. The allocation of human capital between
production and education is determined by the relative returns to human
capital in each sector. Because leisure time is assumed to be constant,
human capital changes in a ﬁxed proportion to education in reaction
to changes in output, so the returns to human capital accumulation are
non-decreasing.
Formally, Lucas (1988) assumes that h is the skill level of a worker,
which aﬀects his productivity. In addition to this internal eﬀect of human
capital, he postulated an external eﬀect from the average level of skills






where L(h) is the number of workers. ha contributes to the productivity
of all factors of production. If workers are all identical, ha simply equals








where Ht = uthtLt is the eﬀective workforce with u the fraction of non-
leisure time. Knowledge accumulates in leisure time:
dht/dt = φht(1− ut) (2.11)
with φ as the productivity parameter for studying. In this model, edu-
cation is the driving force behind long run growth. The capital-output
ratio will change due to the human capital accumulation. It may increase
because more workers will use more sophisticated tools, but it may also
decrease because productivity of knowledge acquisition is higher. The
transitional dynamics of the model show that there is not always con-
vergence to the steady state.
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2.4.2 Endogenizing technological progress
In the models of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), growth is endogenous,
but technological progress itself is not. Spillovers from knowledge and
human capital accumulation help to avoid diminishing returns to the
accumulation of capital, but these externalities are only part of the pro-
cess. Indeed (broad) capital accumulation cannot be inﬁnite in the long
run. The most productive capital units will be used up ﬁrst, and ulti-
mately capital will exhibit diminishing returns. Hence there must be an-
other source for non-zero long run growth, namely technological progress
itself.16 In case technological progress is endogenous, non-decreasing re-
turns in broad capital may emerge in the long run.
An important assumption in the endogenization of innovation is that
knowledge has public good characteristics. Knowledge is non-rival, in
that the use of a piece of knowledge by one agent does not decrease the
opportunity for other agents to use the same piece. Furthermore, knowl-
edge is partially nonexcludable. The use of knowledge by other agents
than the innovator may be prevented by patenting the knowledge. How-
ever, the knowledge in this patent will ultimately diﬀuse to other agents,
who will be able to built on this knowledge. This is called the nonexclud-
ability property. These public good characteristics of knowledge lead to
knowledge spillovers. The research process is characterised by high ﬁxed
costs for inventing the ﬁrst copy of a blueprint, and low marginal costs
in subsequent reproduction. Therefore increasing returns and imperfect
competition arise.
Increasing product variety Romer (1990) introduces rents from
monopoly as an incentive for ﬁrms to innovate. He supposes that in-
vestments in research are necessary for product development, that is,
ﬁrms have to pay sunk costs. These costs have to be compensated by
monopoly rents. As there is free entry into the intermediate goods sec-
tor, there is monopolistic competition but no monopoly or oligopoly. As
in the Romer (1986) model, ﬁnal output is produced with labour and
intermediate goods, but in the Romer (1990) model labour can also be
used in research. Total labour Lt is the sum of labour input in pro-
duction Lx,t and labour input in research Ln,t. Putting Ln,t into R&D
yields designs or licenses for producing new intermediates. The state of
16Population growth may also be endogenized (see for instance Kremer, 1993), and
other forces such as savings behaviour, but history shows technology seems to play a
key role.
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knowledge At is the current number of intermediate inputs. The sunk
cost of producing x units of a given intermediate input is the price PA
for its design. The speed of innovation depends on the aggregate amount
of research and the current state of knowledge (or number of designs)
dAt/dt = δAtLn,t (2.12)
with δ the productivity or research parameter. This is the key equa-
tion in the Romer (1990) model. Researchers can build on the current
state of knowledge At, that is, there are spillovers from past research.
In this sense, knowledge is non-rival. Furthermore, it is excludable as
new varieties of intermediates are patented. The price PA for design is
determined by an arbitrage condition on labour input in production and
research, with labour being indiﬀerent between both types of activity in
equilibrium. The value of the input of intermediates x follows from proﬁt
maximization by the local monopolists. The price PA is the present value





Deriving the steady state growth rate, Romer (1990) ﬁnds that this
growth rate is positively aﬀected by research activity δ and the size
of the economy Lt, and negatively by the rate of time preference. As
ﬁrms cannot fully internalize their contribution to product diversity,
the knowledge spillovers reduce the incentive of these ﬁrms to invest in
research. Therefore growth is below the social optimum.
Quality improvements A limitation of the Romer (1990) model is
that it does not account for obsolescence of old intermediates xi, that is,
Schumpeterian creative destruction. Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop
a model in which horizontal innovation (increasing the product variety)
is replaced by vertical innovation (increasing product quality). They
model the innovation process as is common in the patent-race literature
(Reinganum, 1989). Innovation arises from the invention of a new variety
of intermediate good that replaces the old one. The use of the new
intermediate raises the technology parameter At by a constant factor
γ > 1, the size of innovation. The innovations arrive randomly at the
Poisson arrival rate λn, with λ > 0 the research productivity parameter
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and n the amount of labour used in research.17 Successful innovations
are monopolized until a new innovation occurs.
There are positive spillovers from the research activity, in that the
innovator cannot fully internalize the rents from his or her innovation
(the appropriability eﬀect). Moreover, the knowledge pool can be used
by other ﬁrms for the next innovation (intertemporal spillovers).18 But
there is also a negative spillover, namely the business stealing eﬀect. The
replacement of old intermediates by the new ones destroys the surplus of
the old goods. The higher the chance or arrival rate of a new innovation
is, the shorter the duration of monopoly proﬁts, the smaller the payoﬀ to
innovation, and the larger the creative destruction eﬀect.19 The steady
state growth rate increases with the research productivity parameter
λ, research labour input n and the size of innovation γ. Because of
the business stealing eﬀect, growth may be excessive (above the social
optimum), given the size of innovations. If the size of innovations is
endogenized, it appears that underinvestment in R&D may also occur.
An important contribution of the Aghion and Howitt theory is the
possibility of multiple equilibria, which represents an old historical con-
cept. If growth is slow, ﬁrms tend to do little research because they
cannot beneﬁt from spillovers of another one’s research activity (which
is also low). With high growth, research eﬀorts are larger. As for the
Romer (1990) model, the basic model of Aghion and Howitt (1992) has
its limitations, such as the assumptions on a steady state with balanced
growth, and Harrod-neutral technological change. Aghion and Howitt
(1998a) also indicate that their endogenous growth models do not fully
incorporate the role of institutions.
Furthermore, the endogenous growth theory continued to lack em-
pirical foundation. Jones (1995) argued that the steady rise of R&D
intensity since the 1960s has not led to increasing but to constant or de-
creasing economic growth rates. Aghion and Howitt (1998a, 2005) how-
ever, argue that technological progress has become increasingly complex,
requiring an ever-increasing R&D to maintain the same innovation rate
as before. If population growth increases the size of the economy, the
17Assume a Cobb Douglas production function for ﬁnal goods, yt = Atx
α
t , and the
total ﬁxed stock of labour Lt = xt + nt, with xt the amount of labour in ﬁnal goods
and nt the research labour input.
18Incumbent innovators do not perform R&D because all other researchers have
immediate access to the incumbent technology A.
19In the model, another negative eﬀect of research comes from the upward pressure
on wages for research labour, which decreases the monopoly proﬁts.
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number of imitations also increases, and thereby the allocation of R&D
to more research areas.
Another issue is the distinction between incremental and radical in-
novations, or general purpose technologies (GPTs). Economic historians
emphasize the diﬀerent nature of major and minor innovations. Follow-
ing up on their 1992 model, Aghion and Howitt (1998b) argue that a
model with radical innovations show similar dynamics to a model with
incremental innovations. There are three stages in the adoption of a new
GPT: the introduction of the GPT, its use in manufacturing and its dif-
fusion to other sectors. Aghion and Howitt (1998b) ﬁnd that diﬀusion
may be slow and that growth may slow down.
Finally, the issue of international technology diﬀusion has only re-
cently been examined in more detail (see Section 2.4.3). In the basic
Aghion and Howitt (1992) model, two independent economies have a
strong tendency to diverge, as each will grow at its own rate determined
by its own research eﬀort. If a country X has a higher technology level
than country Z, the two countries diverge even with the same size of
innovations and research productivity. But with open economies, inter-
national technology transfer may lead to β-convergence (Aghion and
Howitt, 1998a, p.68-70).
Human capital and bounded externalities In a slightly broader
interpretation, the R&D in the models of Romer (1990) and Aghion and
Howitt (1992) also include human capital input into the accumulation
of knowledge. Skilled labour in the research sector fosters innovation. In
addition, the Romer (1990) model built on Arrovian learning or exter-
nalities. The models of Stokey (1988), Lucas (1993) and Young (1993a,
1993b) focus more explicitly on the role of human capital in growth. Hu-
man capital generates bounded externalities, as learning is tied to physi-
cal bodies. Young (1993a, 1993b) built on the Aghion and Howitt (1992)
model by combinng the two concepts of innovation and bounded learn-
ing by doing. After the introduction of a new technology, the inherent
physical limit on its productivity slows down learning, unless a new in-
novation comes about. This is consistent with the historical evidence on
long-lasting technological stagnation (Crafts, 1995). Aghion and Howitt
(1992) also do not allow for the possibility that new technologies may
complement older ones, which creates rents instead of destroying them.
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2.4.3 International technology diﬀusion
The development of the endogenous growth theory inspired to develop
open economy growth models with international technology diﬀusion.
These models sometimes attempted to explain the existence and persis-
tence of convergence clubs of poor, less poor and rich countries (Quah,
1997). International technology diﬀusion might also be an important
source of convergence compared to convergence in capital-labour ratios,
as economic history shows (Bernard and Jones, 1996a).
Technology may cross borders in a disembodied form, for instance
via personal contacts in research (tacit knowledge transfer), blueprints,
ideas, scientiﬁc principles, books, patents and so on. Here, a country’s
own research eﬀort, or its human capital stock or accumulation, is sup-
posed to enhance the adoption of leading-edge technology from abroad,
and to overcome barriers to adoption. International technology diﬀu-
sion may also occur via embodiment in traded goods or through inter-
national mobility of factors of production such as capital investments,
capital goods, and skilled labour. This is a weaker form of international
knowledge diﬀusion, but trade may not bring only technology embodied
in traded intermediates but also increase the probability of international
disembodied knowledge spillovers or cross-border learning (Keller, 2004).
Disembodied technology diﬀusion The ﬁrst theories with inter-
national technology diﬀusion assumed that it creates a world knowl-
edge pool which is accessible at (nearly) zero cost. Current researchers
“stand on the shoulders of giants” (Caballero and Jaﬀe, 1993). But soon
the models started to mention the importance of own R&D providing
absorptive capacity. Here I discuss the model of Howitt (2000) which ba-
sically incorporates this concept.20 Nelson and Phelps (1966) stated that
human capital creates absorptive capacity. Howitt adopted this idea, but
then for R&D, following Cohen and Levinthal (1989) in that R&D has
a dual role for the ﬁrm: creating innovations and providing the ability
to understand knowledge from elsewhere. Hence, an economy needs to
invest in (domestic) R&D in order to build capacity to absorb foreign
technology.
20Other models are developed by, for instance, Eaton and Kortum (1996, 1997,
1999), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997). I discuss the Howitt (2000) model, of
which the foundations are developed by Aghion and Howitt (1998a), as the model is
the basis for the formal models developed in the current thesis (Chapters 4 and 5).
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Howitt (2000) supposes there is a worldwide ‘leading-edge technol-
ogy’ level
Amaxt ≡ max Ajt (i) | i ∈ [0, N jt ], j = i, ...,m (2.14)
with countries j and intermediates or sectors i. An innovation in sector
i of a country j at time t gives a new generation of that country’s ith
product, with its productivity equal to Amaxt .
21 The country’s average
productivity parameter At grows at
dAt/dt = λnt(Amaxt −At) (2.15)
with λnt the Poisson arrival rate of innovation. If Amaxt would not grow,
then the country’s average productivity level At would converge to Amaxt
as long as λnt > 0. However, if the leading edge Amaxt is continuously
increasing at a rate gt, then in the long run, more innovative economies
will have higher productivity levels At because their intermediates are
generally more up to date. Deﬁning the country’s distance or gap to
the leading edge frontier as at ≡ At/Amaxt , Howitt (2000) derives the
convergence mechanism
dat/dt = λnt(1− at)− atgt (2.16)
An increase in nt or R&D causes productivity growth to increase tem-
porarily, but as the gap (1− at) narrows, innovations will raise average
productivity by less and less, slowing down the growth rate of the av-
erage. In the long run, countries will converge to the same growth rate
but their average productivity level will not.22
In the steady state countries will fall into two clubs. One club con-
sists of countries with highly productive R&D, good education and a
good intellectual property right protection. Their gap with the world’s
technology frontier will be constant in the long run, and they will grow
at the frontier’s growth rate. Countries in the second club have a rela-
tively poor position in the underlying parameters and will not grow in
the long run. They will not invest in R&D any more, and their technol-
ogy gaps with the frontier will increase forever at the rate at which the
frontier grows.
21Hence, the size of innovation in sector i will depend on how long it has been since
the last innovation in that sector. In the Aghion and Howitt (1992) model, this size
is a ﬁxed constant, neglecting spillover from other sectors (Howitt, 2000).
22Howitt (2000) assumes there is no international trade in goods or factors, and
that product variety increases through serendipitous imitation.
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Like Howitt (2000), Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) draw upon the
ideas of Nelson and Phelps (1966) on absorptive capacity. Benhabib and
Spiegel (2005) assume the stock of human capital (or level of education)
is a means to speed up technology diﬀusion, thereby leading to catch up
in total factor productivity. They discuss two models, a Nelson-Phelps
model in which countries catch up with the leader, and a model in which
a country needs a minimum capital stock to catch up. They conclude
that the latter model describes the catch up process well.
Krueger and Kumar (2004a) develop a model which distinguishes
general education and skill speciﬁc, vocational education. General edu-
cation is costly to obtain but enables workers to operate new production
technologies. An economy with relatively more vocational education will
grow slower in the long run. Moreover, the faster technology progresses,
the larger the gap in growth will be between countries with general and
vocational education.
Another recent study on international externalities is Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (2005). In contrast to Howitt (2000), they start by renu-
merating empirical observations that countries in the long run do grow at
the same rate. They argue that international technology spillovers must
therefore be very substantial, despite diﬀerences in investment rates.
They suppose that modest barriers to technology absorption might ac-
count for a large part of diﬀerences in total factor productivity. Further-
more, they emphasize that broad capital and technology are not always
separable.
Appropriate technology and institutions With increasing inter-
est in the ultimate sources of growth (see, for instance, Van de Klun-
dert, 1997), mainstream economists attempt to formalize some of the
economic-historical concepts on resistance or barriers to technology adop-
tion, technology congruence and social capability to adopt. These models
also draw upon the old ideas of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) on localized
technological progress and learning.
Parente and Prescott (1994) discuss the role of barriers to technology
adoption, of which the size diﬀers across countries and over time. The
larger the barriers, the greater investments or costs to adopt foreign
leading technology. Basu and Weil (1998) develop an AK-like model
in which technologies are speciﬁc to particular combinations of inputs.
That is, foreign technologies have to be ‘appropriate’ to a country’s
factor proportions if they are to be absorbed. They assume that all
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technology is freely available and instantly transferred. There are non-
linearities between savings and growth, which allows for the possibility
of growth miracles (Lucas, 1993). A growth miracle occurs when a small
change in savings leads to large changes in growth.
Caselli and Coleman II (2005) model both appropriateness and barri-
ers to adoption. They assume that there is imperfect substitutability be-
tween skilled and unskilled labour, and that technology is not neutral in
the use of skill. Technologies which use skilled labour more eﬃciently use
unskilled labour less eﬃciently, and vice versa. The technology frontier
is country-speciﬁc; richer countries experience lower barriers to adop-
tion and a wider array of potential technologies. Caselli and Coleman II
(2005) conclude that the role of barriers to adoption is more important
than shows up from a model with factor-neutral technologies. This is
because appropriate choice of technology mitigates the impact of diﬀer-
ences in factor proportions, as countries suit their technology choice to
their factor supplies.
Temple (1998) assumes that the relative eﬃciency function of a coun-
try j is dependent on a catch up eﬀect (measured by the productivity
relative to the world maximum level) and an appropriateness eﬀect (rep-










The relative eﬃciency is decreasing in the ﬁrst argument and increasing
in the second. This captures the idea that research will be more pro-
ductive the closer is a country’s K/L-ratio to that of the leader. This
model allows for multiple equilibria, and it breaks down the dichotomy
between input and TFP levels.
Acemoglu et al. (2002) assume that absorption of technology from
the world frontier is mainly done by older experienced managers, and
that high-skilled (usually younger) managers engage in innovation. The
model distinguishes two types of growth strategies by countries. Coun-
tries far below the frontier pursue an investment-based strategy, with
little selection of high-skill managers, and larger and older ﬁrms, larger
investments and enduring relationships. Countries closer to the fron-
tier use an innovation-based strategy with better selection of managers.
23Temple (1998) notes that the appropriateness eﬀect can also be reﬂected by other
variables than the relative K/L ratio, such as the relative supply of skills, resource
endowments and demand conditions.
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Backward economies should not switch from investment to innovation
too soon, but also should not fall into a trap. (Endogenous) policy and
institutions appear to be crucial.
Vandenbussche et al. (2004) state that human capital has a level
eﬀect and a composition eﬀect. An increase in the aggregate level of
human capital (ceteris paribus) is always growth-enhancing. But condi-
tional on the human capital level, the composition of human capital and
the distance to the frontier determine growth. Skilled labour enhances
growth to a larger extent when closer to the frontier, provided that in-
novation is more skill-biased than imitation. This implies that skilled
human capital is a source for divergence.
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) argue many endogenous growth
models cannot explain persistent growth diﬀerences during a very long
time period. In these models, all countries have the same growth rate
in the long run. This contrasts historical evidence on divergence in the
nineteenth and twentieth century. Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) as-
sume that technology diﬀusion is diﬃcult and skill-intensive, and ab-
sorptive capacity is required. They assume that skills are less eﬀective
in a technologically lagging country. They also assume that keeping in
pace with the progressing technology frontier requires increasingly more
skills. Hence a country’s stock of eﬀective skills depends on its distance
to the frontier. The absorptive capacity of a laggard country may erode.
The model ﬁnally assumes the introduction of ‘modern R&D’ at a
certain time t. Before this date, innovation arises from a form of prag-
matic creativity, or ‘implementation’. Both R&D and implementation
are costly and skill intensive, but R&D draws more heavily on scientiﬁc
knowledge and requires higher levels of skill. A switch from implemen-
tation to R&D requires surpassing a threshold skill level that increases
with the frontier. In the long run equilibrium, there are three clubs
of countries. The ﬁrst consists of countries with leading technology; in
the second club are follower countries with an initially suﬃciently high
critical threshold level of absorptive capacity to follow the leaders at
a constant distance, and the third group falls further behind forever.
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) dispute that persistence of institu-
tions explains persistent growth diﬀerences, as argued by Acemoglu et
al. (2005). Institutions do have an eﬀect on research and education, and
in turn on absorption capacity.
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Trade and mobile factors of production Extension of endoge-
nous growth models with trade oﬀers the possibility to model sector
speciﬁc ﬂows of technology, though this is still a less developed area of
growth research. Countries specialize in trade and absorb the technolo-
gies they need for the products of their export sectors (Archibugi and
Pianta, 1992). This specialization may lead to divergence in technologi-
cal progress, and simple copying of foreign technology will become even
more diﬃcult. In some cases, specialization leads to structural shifts in
the sectoral structure. Eventually, leapfrogging may occur. Comparative
advantage becomes endogenous in a framework with trade and mobile
factors of production.
A simple leapfrogging model is that of Brezis et al. (1993). A leader
exploits a high-productive technology at the moment that a major inno-
vation occurs. Because of its experience with the older high-productive
technology, applying the new technology does not pay for the leader at
that moment. However, for a follower country, adopting the innovation
oﬀers a potential to catch up during a learning process, until the follower
ultimately passes the leaders in productivity. The model assumes that
all this will happen if the follower country has relatively low wages (that
is, learning costs in the adoption of the new technology are lower than
in the leader country) and if the old technology has initially a higher
productivity in the leader country. This multisector model of Brezis et
al. (1993) is simple and appealing, but historically not always justiﬁed.
For instance, when the US surpassed the leader UK around the turn
of the nineteenth century, wages were relatively high in the US. More-
over, a leader country may be sometimes in a better position to learn
from a new technology than a follower country. An example of such an
advantage may be the recent developments in ICT in the US.
The new trade and geography literature (e.g. Fujita et al., 2001)
provides some tools and concepts to model knowlege ﬂows via trade
in an endogenous growth framework. Grossman and Helpman (1991)
model the impact of diﬀusion of technology from ‘North’ to ‘South’.
North conducts much R&D and creates specialized intermediates which
are exported to the South, that invests much less or nothing in R&D.
Or North’s R&D eﬀorts may create spillovers that leads to new inter-
mediate inputs in South. Eaton and Kortum (2001, 2002) also apply
a Schumpeterian model with trade. The modeling of international fac-
tor mobility has been less extensively developed. However, Lucas (1988)
already mentions the impact of migration of labour.
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2.4.4 Alternative growth theory
Evolutionary economics Evolutionary growth theory is developed
partially because of discontent with mainstream growth theory. Though
both strands of the growth literature ﬁnd inspiration in Schumpeter’s
(1942) ideas in attaching a key role to innovation in long run growth,
and though recent endogenous growth models pay more attention to
phenomena like divergence and appropriate institutions, the two strands
diﬀer fundamentally (Fagerberg, 2003; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002).
First, endogenous growth theory starts from methodological indi-
vidualism in which an individual, representative, rational agent acts
upon perfect or at least predictable stochastic information. In evolution-
ary theory, a non-reducionist approach prevails; the micro- and macro-
economic levels interact with each other. The economy evolves through
the actions of a population of heterogenous, boundedly rational agents
ﬁnding their way via trial and error in largely uncertain environment.
Firms operate in a national innovation system which consists of diﬀerent
domains of institutions, economy and technology exerting strong mutual
inﬂuences (Freeman and Soete, 1987; Dosi et al., 1990). The inﬂuence of
actors (selection environment) and other factors than technology (such
as institutions) are important.
Second, in mainstream theory, knowledge is a non-rival and partially
excludable good that spreads freely given certain legal arrangements that
may limit the availability of public knowledge. Knowledge develops by
means of learning by doing and R&D. Evolutionary economists sup-
pose knowledge resides in ﬁrms as shared routines reproduced through
practice (Nelson and Winter 1982). Knowledge is often tacit and em-
bodied in the routines. Knowledge develops by means of a combination
of various forms of learning with radical technological and organiza-
tional innovations. An unpredictable and complex environment guides
the ﬁrms’ strategies or capabilities.24 This leads to two issues (Fager-
berg and Verspagen, 2002). First, the distinction between radical and
incremental innovations is crucial. Radical innovations disrupt existing
structures and interdependencies. Incremental innovations depend on
speciﬁc historical and institutional context. Second, innovation leads to
24Policy implications therefore also diﬀer. Mainstream theory uses market failures
as a legitimacy for policy. Evolutionary economists do not believe in the public good
characteristics of knowledge and have other policy conclusions: increase variety of
activity or actors (e.g. start ups); and increase the economy’s capacity to absorb
innovations to overcome inertia or resistance to new ways (Fagerberg, 2003).
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divergence, imitation or diﬀusion to convergence.
A ﬁnal diﬀerence is that mainstream theory considers convergence as
a smooth transitional process towards the steady state, while evolution-
ary economics views economic growth as a process of continuous change.
Evolutionary growth is a process of strong regularities and qualitative
changes driven by ﬁrms, governments and other organizations, with a
diverse set of motivations, decision rules and capabilities. Technology
catching up is not a question of replacing obsolete technologies but a
continuous transformation of technological economic and institutional
structures. The speed of catching up depends on the economy’s ability
to transform social, institutional and economic structures (Fagerberg,
1987, 1994, 1995; Verspagen, 1991). One implication is that diﬀerences
in economic growth are hard to predict (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002).
Furthermore, in the long run, there needs not be convergence. Finally,
structural growth and cyclical variation are not separable.
Post-Keynesian modeling Scott (1989) developed a Post-Keynesian
growth model, which also builds on Arrovian learning eﬀects. An impor-
tant element in his model is that capital and technology investments
are not separable. R&D is just one of the many forms of investments.
He argues that because the future is uncertain, perceived investment
opportunities are based on the present day situation. The rate of return
to (knowledge) investment needs not to be depressed at a later date, as
“all experience suggests that it does not” (Scott, 1992, p.625). However,
elaborated neoclassical endogenous growth models also take physical
capital accumulation into account, although it is still considered as a
fundamentally diﬀerent form of investment than R&D, exactly because
of the properties of knowledge (nonrivalry and partial nonexcludability).
2.4.5 Growth regressions
The modern empirical growth literature from the 1980s onwards is rather
bulky. Growth accountants continued to construct data and the new
growth models stimulated further data research. Initially, growth re-
gressions were applied in a rather ad hoc way on a large range of ex-
planatory variables: capital, human capital, macro-economic variables,
government, law, policy, social capital and so forth. But the modern
growth models increasingly determine the speciﬁcations of the growth
regressions by providing a structural framework.
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With respect to international growth diﬀerences and technology dif-
fusion, a number of regression approaches can be renumerated, based
on their main focus and the underlying conceptual framework: condi-
tional convergence; evolutionary technology gap models; trade, FDI and
geography; and knowledge spillovers via own R&D and human capital.
This modern growth evidence seem to indicate that the following
factors are of economic importance: initial conditions (initial per capita
income), openness (although there are localization eﬀects), the creation
of absorptive capacity via own R&D and human capital, and diﬀerent
types of skill.25
Criticism on growth regressions Surveys of the modern evidence,
such as Temple (1999), Durlauf and Quah (1999), Brock and Durlauf
(2001), Keller (2004) and Durlauf et al. (2005), also discuss the nega-
tive aspects of the literature. This criticism concerns the robustness of
the underlying cross-country or panel data and proxies for variables, the
heterogeneity of the sample of countries, the selection of the explanatory
variables, and the diﬃculties in interpretation of the regression results
due to, for instance, simultaneity, endogeneity of the explanatory vari-
ables and multicollinearity.
The main problem is that the parameter estimates are unstable
(Levine and Renelt, 1992; Durlauf and Quah, 1999). On the other hand,
much of the variability in the results can be explained by the variation in
the sample, the time period, and the used explanatory variables. There
seems to be a number of variables that often turn out to be related to
growth (such as initial per capita GDP). Moreover, the coeﬃcients on
the other variables might be signiﬁcant conditional on the earlier men-
tioned variables. Another problem with regressions is that one or more
of the explanatory variables are actually endogenous. Instrumental vari-
ables might be applied to control for this endogeneity, at least for certain
variables.
Conditional convergence Early regressions aimed at the testing of
β-convergence examine what determines cross-country diﬀerences and
convergence in the rate of growth. These regression equations are often
based on a Solovian model. Early regression of the growth of per capita
income on the initial per capita income did not provide evidence for
β-convergence. Subsequent studies added variables, sometimes inspired
25The role of institutions is also tested, although much work remains to be done.
2.4. Modern growth theory and empirics 45
by endogenous growth theory. This provided evidence on conditional
convergence. In most regressions, two or more of four variables were
included: a catching up variable such as the initial level of real per capita
income, investments or capital intensity, population and education (see
Table 2.3).
Table 2.3: Cross-country regression results
Dowrick/ Baumol Barro Mankiw Levine/ Wolﬀ Verspagen
Nguyen et al. et al. Renelt
1989 1989 1991 1992 1992 1991 1991
test period ’50-’81 ’50-’81 ’60-’85 ’60-’85 ’60-’85 1880- ’60-’85
1979
observations 63 57 55 98 86 6 90
R2 0.38 0.41 0.63 0.46 0.73 0.81 0.31
s.e. regr. 1.06 0.30 0.01 0.33 0.01
dependent GDP/ GDP/ GDP/ GDP per GDP/ rel.prod- technol.
variable capita capita capita work.age capita uctivity gap
person growth
between t-stat t-stat st.error st.error st.error t-stat t-stat
parentheses
constant 1.04 0.04 3.04 20.50 -0.01 0.02
(4.45) (0.01) (0.83) (1.12) (1.64) (4.67)
catch up -0.78 -2.41 -0.01 -0.29 -0.57 -0.08 -0.03
variable (-3.10) (4.09) (0.00) (0.062) (0.12) (5.00) (5.80)




population 0.57 -14.88 -0.51 -0.02
(3.53) (2.14) (0.29) (0.19)








more other no no yes no yes yes yes
variables?
Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) ﬁnd that no overall convergence oc-
curred in the period 1950-1981 in a group of 63 countries. There was
some TFP catch up for richer countries. Poorer countries did not catch
up because of relatively low investment rates. Baumol et al. (1989) in-
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troduce education, which was positively correlated with the growth of
per capita GDP, whereas population growth turned out to have a nega-
tive coeﬃcient, in contrast to Dowrick and Nguyen (1989). Barro (1991)
splits the education variable into 1960 levels of primary and secondary
schooling, both of which have a positive correlation with growth.
A famous study is Mankiw et al. (1992). They augment the Solow
model with human capital, and show that conditional convergence takes
place, as Barro (1991) also had concluded. They ﬁnd that countries on
average converge to their steady states at around 2% per year. The
steady state levels vary across countries. Panel data studies ﬁnd higher
rates of convergence (e.g. Islam, 1995). However, panel study outcomes
might be wrong, depending on whether they are dynamic panel esti-
mates. When the estimation method is wrong, outcomes may be aﬀected
by a small sample bias, and the estimates are inconsistent.
The initial level of per capita GDP (the catching up variable) appar-
ently has a robust negative relationship with growth, conditional on hu-
man capital accumulation or education. Levine and Renelt (1992) tested
the regressions of other studies on the sensitivity of the estimations. They
ﬁnd sensitivity to be very high. They tested the Barro (1991) regressions
again and ﬁnd that only investment, initial income and the dummies for
diﬀerent regions or continents are signiﬁcant. Moreover, they emphasize
that the coeﬃcients only show a correlation, and do not tell much about
the direction of causality. Only within a structural framework or model
(probably reduced form), something might be said on causality, provided
that econometric problems are not too large, such as multicollinearity
and endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Furthermore, the mea-
surement of certain key variables, such as human capital, remains be
diﬃcult. Human capital, for instance, ideally includes formal education
and on-the-job training. Hence, schooling data are only a proxy for hu-
man capital. The evidence on the relation between human capital and
growth is rather weak.
Another study by Wolﬀ (1991) covers a very long period (1880-1979).
He uses a pooled cross section, without investment, education or pop-
ulation, and includes the relative initial level of productivity and the
capital/labour ratio, together with country and period dummies. The
coeﬃcient on the initial productivity is negative and that of the capi-
tal/labour ratio positive. Capital intensity appears to be important for a
country in the catch up process. The US became the world’s technolog-
ical leader when it surpassed the UK around the turn of the nineteenth
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century to the twentieth century.
Testing the technology gap model The technology gap concept in
the evolutionary theory (see Section 2.4.4) is also tested. Seminal studies
are Fagerberg (1987, 1988), Verspagen (1991) and Fagerberg and Verspa-
gen (2002). The latter regress the growth rate of GDP on three variables:
innovation (measured by patent growth), the potential for diﬀusion (the
level of productivity or GDP per capita) and complementary factors
that contribute to the exploitation of this potential, that is absorptive
capacity (proxied by investments and industrial structure). They esti-
mate this for a pool of 29 countries and three time periods 1966-1972,
1973-1983, and 1984-1995, including time-slope and time dummies. They
conclude from the regression results that the scope for diﬀusion appears
to be lower after 1983 than previously. Innovation is important, par-
ticularly in the last time period. A look at the diﬀerences between the
US and other countries suggests that diﬀusion is important, even in the
most recent period, but that it had become more diﬃcult. Furthermore,
innovation eﬀorts have become particularly important in this recent pe-
riod. This seems to indicate that the US (particularly its services sector)
are forging ahead, possibly because of the impact of ICT. One criticism
one might have on the technology gap approach is that catching up is
measured by means of per capita GDP. This suggests a one-to-one rela-
tionship between technology diﬀusion and catch up in per capita GDP
or labour productivity, while this may not be the case. Technology lead-
ership is not the same as labour productivity leadership (see Broadberry,
1994a).
Diﬀusion via trade, FDI and geography Regression studies on
trade-related and embodied international R&D spillovers helped to focus
more attention on international knowledge spillovers (see Keller, 2004).
Nadiri (1993) explores previous studies on international R&D spillovers
and shows that there are signiﬁcant spillovers eﬀects and that these
are growing over time. These spillovers ﬂow via trade and multinational
enterprises (Nadiri, 1993, p.35). Wolﬀ and Nadiri (1993) ﬁnd that R&D
embodied in capital stock generates sizeable spillovers between sectors,
whereby private R&D generates stronger spillovers than public R&D
(see also Lichtenberg, 1992).
Jaﬀe et al. (1993) study whether spillovers are geographically lo-
calized. The advantage of being near other ﬁrms or universities might
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dominate the eﬀect of openness of countries. Jaﬀe et al. (1993) ﬁnd,
on the basis of patent citations in the US market, that US patents are
more often cited by other US patents than by foreign patents. Hence,
spillovers are geographically bounded, and this localization eﬀect fades
only slowly over time. The localization eﬀect is also found by Branstet-
ter (2001), who uses micro-econometric data on R&D and patents on
US and Japanese ﬁrms. Keller (2002) estimates spillovers conditional on
distance and the country locations relative to each other. He ﬁnds that
the decay of technology diﬀusion increases with distance, and that this
decay is rather large. With every 1200 kilometers, there is a 50% drop in
diﬀusion. Finally, this localization eﬀect had become smaller over time,
probably due to increasing economic integration. The question remains
what the localization eﬀect exactly does mean in an economic sense:
trade costs, tacit knowledge transfer or other factors (Keller, 2004).
A seminal study on trade-related spillovers is that of Coe and Help-
man (1995). They regress the (log of) total factor productivity of a coun-
try on domestic and foreign R&D stocks for a sample of 22 countries.
The foreign stock is the bilateral import-share weighted R&D stocks of
the country’s trade partners. The more a country trades with countries
with high R&D intensity, the more it is likely to receive high-productive
knowledge embodied in intermediate goods imported from those coun-
tries. Coe and Helpman (1995) ﬁnd the average elasticity of domestic
TFP with respect to foreign R&D capital is 0.09. The importance of for-
eign R&D increases the more open the economy is, or the smaller its size.
They argue that domestic R&D remains important in that it enhances
the eﬀective use of resources and the countrys ability to adopt foreign
knowledge. Lichtenberg and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1998) also
apply a trade-weighting system to aggregate foreign R&D capital. They
ﬁnd an average elasticity of domestic TFP with respect to foreign R&D
capital of 0.11. Also here the more open a country is, the higher the
elasticity. Lichtenberg and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) use
FDI-weights instead of import-weights. Keller (1998) shows that the Coe
and Helpman (1995) result can also be obtained with randomly created
weights. So the evidence on imports as a conduit for knowledge spillovers
is not robust. Subsequent studies have attempted to ﬁnd a solution to
this, but more research is needed (Keller, 2004). The empirical literature
on FDI-related spillovers is even less conclusive on the robustness of the
evidence. FDI by multinationals brings new or better technology to do-
mestic ﬁrms. Recent micro-economic studies seem to point to a positive
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impact from FDI (Keller, 2004).
Eaton and Kortum (2001, 2002) are recent examples of endogenous
models on trade-related spillovers. They assume that unit transport costs
increase with geographical distance, so that the price of intermediates
in remote (or poor) countries is high (that is, productivity is low). They
show these eﬀects are present, diﬀerences in the relative price of equip-
ment appear to account for 25% of the productivity diﬀerence across the
sample of 34 countries (Eaton and Kortum, 2001). However, this out-
come is not consistent with actual international equipment good prices
which are are relatively high in rich countries.
Diﬀusion via own R&D and human capital A ﬁnal strand of
modern growth empirics focusses on (disembodied) knowledge spillovers
via own R&D and human capital. It highlights the role of absorptive ca-
pacity. The estimations suggest that absorptive capacity is economically
important, and that this is only created by own eﬀorts in R&D and the
stock of skilled human capital. Free rider behaviour appears to be not
possible.
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) estimate (using data on a cross section
of 78 countries for the period 1965-1985) that absorptive capacity, as
measured by an interactive term between the productivity gap and the
level of human capital, is statistically signiﬁcant. More recently, Ben-
habib and Spiegel (2005) estimate a nonlinear speciﬁcation of TFP for a
cross section of countries between 1960 and 1995. They ﬁnd that a logis-
tic speciﬁcation is the right one, that is, countries need a critical stock of
human capital to catch up. Otherwise countries will grow slower than the
leader. This appears also to be the case for the 22 out of 27 countries, for
which the model predicts slower growth because of lack of human capi-
tal. Frantzen (2000) also ﬁnds in a cross section that education beneﬁts
absorptive capacity.
Eaton and Kortum (1996) ﬁnd that inward technology diﬀusion in-
creases with the level of human capital. Eaton and Kortum (1999) es-
timate that productivity growth due to domestic as opposed to foreign
R&D is between 11 and 16% in Germany, France and the UK, about
35% for Japan and 60% for the US. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de
la Potterie (2001) weigh foreign stocks of business R&D by (bilateral)
technological proximity (of technological ﬁelds of patents). They state
that eﬀective absorption of certain technologies depends on own domes-
tic research in those technologies. Their estimates reveal that the average
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elasticity of TFP with respect to foreign R&D is over 40%. This elastic-
ity is higher the higher the own research intensity of the country under
consideration.
Griﬃth et al. (2004) use panel data for industries in 12 OECD coun-
tries in the period 1971-1990. They ﬁnd R&D to be statistically and eco-
nomically signiﬁcant for technology catching up and innovation. R&D
plays a role in the convergence of TFP levels within industries across
OECD countries, and this result appears to be robust. Human capital
also plays a large role in productivity growth, but trade has only a small
eﬀect. Griﬃth et al. (2004) think that the reason why lagging countries
do not invest more in R&D is because of inappropriate institutions or
policies in these countries. Furthermore, they think interindustry tech-
nology diﬀusion should also be investigated in future economic research.
Rogers (2004) applies alternative proxies for absorptive capacity in a
cross country sample over the period 1960-1995. The rate of technologi-
cal catch up is determined by the size of the technology gap (proxied by
the log of initial GDP per capita, the coeﬃcient appears to be always
negative and signiﬁcant) and the level of absorptive capacity. The lat-
ter is proxied by the number of students overseas, telecommunications,
publications, patent and trade data. These are potential channels of in-
ternational technology diﬀusion. Depending on the estimation method,
Rogers (2004) ﬁnds the study abroad proxy, or the telecommunications
and publication proxies to be positive and signiﬁcant. The proxies of
trade openness and imports of equipment appeared to be not signiﬁ-
cant.
Appropriate technology models are tested by Caselli and Coleman
II (2005) and Comin and Hobijn (2004). Caselli and Coleman II (2005)
use data for 52 countries in 1988 in a calibration of their model to show
that the relationship between the eﬃciency of skilled labour and income
is stronger than that between unskilled labour and income, indicating a
relative skill bias. The latter may even decline with income (absolute skill
bias). Caselli and Coleman II (2002) ﬁnd similar results on a time series
application on US data from 1963 to 1992. Comin and Hobijn (2004) es-
timate a model in which diﬀerences in productivity levels at sectoral and
aggregate level are explained by technologies in use. They use a broad
range of technological adoption measures covering 17 technologies for 21
advanced countries over 180 years. They ﬁnd that international diﬀer-
ences in productivity are almost completely determined by the quality
of the worst technology in use, rather than by the quality of the newest
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technology just adopted or by the number of technologies in use. They
also ﬁnd that the TFP component related to the range of technologies
in use is highly correlated with overall sectoral TFP diﬀerences across
countries.
Vandenbussche et al. (2004) also provide empirical results on their
model that is built upon the endogenous growth theory. Their panel data
cover 19 OECD countries for the period 1960-2000. Previous empirical
research had shown no positive relationship between the initial school-
ing level and subsequent growth in rich countries. Vandenbussche et al.
(2004) now show that the composition of human capital is important.
Primary and secondary schooling (unskilled labour) and tertiary educa-
tion (skilled labour) should be separated. In their empirical application
it appears that tertiary schooling is causing economic divergence.
2.5 Conclusions
What has the literature to say about international technology diﬀusion
and its impact on economic growth? What questions are still open?
Connecting diﬀerent strands of theory and empirics Are there
gains from a synthesis between diﬀerent strands of growth theory and
empirics? Scholars from various backgrounds have mentioned such gains
(see for instance, Solow, 1994; Crafts, 1996; Barro, and Sala-i-Martin,
1995; Romer, 1994; Keller, 2004; Aghion and Howitt, 2005).
Endogenous growth theory seems to be a framework where ideas from
all other diﬀerent strands are brought together. But to economic histori-
ans and historical growth accountants, endogenous innovation and diﬀu-
sion, externality eﬀects from knowledge accumulation, accumulation of
human capital and absorptive capacity have always been important con-
cepts. These concepts have been taken up by the modern formal growth
models, which has enriched the growth analysis. Unfortunately, the em-
pirical basis of endogenous growth theory is still not very strong, despite
the enormous growth of databases and proxies. Regression studies have
recently made attempts, as the current literature survey shows.
For instance, it remains diﬃcult to incorporate institutional settings
into the models. Crafts (1996) does not believe the role of R&D to be
so large. In historical perspective, capital accumulation and learning is
more important than is usually thought in mainstream theory, and the
inﬂuence of policies smaller than thought. Moreover, education, mar-
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ket size and R&D do not tell the whole story. The reaping of latent
knowledge in certain directions of technological progress does also play
its role. Furthermore, he thinks the role of international technology dif-
fusion is overdone. Local circumstances and international diﬀerences in
technology congruence act as a barrier to diﬀusion. Finally, theoretical
niceties should not be overestimated. Kuznets (1965, p.5) emphasized
that theory has to be considered as just a guide to further study of data
construction and to direct future research.
To growth accountants and economic historians, endogenous growth
theory oﬀers the possibility of formalization and testing of empirical con-
cepts. Formalization forces economic historians to be clear and explicit
in their hypotheses on technology and growth. Growth theory serves
a framework of analysis in which causal relationships are established.
Growth accounts only quantify the relative contribution of variables to
growth, assuming some relationship between these variables and growth.
As Kuznets already stated (1965, p.81), “the wider view of the theory
of economic growth advocated here forces recognition of the mutabil-
ity of many partial doctrines that claim allegiance because they glorify,
consciously of unconsciously, their conclusions. For this reason, and in-
dispensable prerequisite for work toward such a theory is the fullest
freedom in pursuit of testable ﬁndings, in continuous reformulation of
interrelations in the light of additional evidence, and in the spread of
accumulated results to ever-wider circles. In turn, this work might serve
to reduce the obstacles stemming from the dogmatism that attaches to
theories which claim eternal and universal validity.”
The developments since the 1990s give reason for optimism about
a collaboration between diﬀerent strands of theory and empirics. Both
acknowledge the key role of technological change in economic growth and
that this has to be analyzed within a historical context. Historical case
studies might reveal much of the peculiarities of technology, its diﬀusion
and its impact on growth. However, the robustness of cases cannot be
tested. “The best bet, no doubt, would be collaboration between model-
builders and those who use informal methods, to compromise between
one side’s need for deﬁniteness and the other side’s sense of complexity”
(Solow, 1994, p.52).
A growth model with international technology diﬀusion Which
elements should a growth framework with international technology dif-
fusion contain?
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First of all, a long run view is essential to gain insight in the growth
process and the role of international technology diﬀusion in this process.
Driving forces in economy and society may require a long time for change
before they are observed. Moreover, technology diﬀusion itself may be
slow.
Second, disentangling international technology diﬀusion from local
economic and social forces may clarify the mechanism of diﬀusion and
growth. Because convergence and catching up are conditional on eco-
nomic and social forces, productivity catching up and technology catch-
ing up are not synonymous. Technology ﬂows to other countries, but it is
often adapted by these countries and sometimes it may not be absorbed
after all.
Third, the economic-historical literature points to two fundamental
forces in the long run: technology incongruence and social capability.
Technology incongruence arises when countries diﬀer in factor propor-
tions and market conditions. The choice of a technology system is usually
forced by local circumstances, and its subsequent development is path
dependent. Hence geography, sectoral structure and history matters in
the explanation of economic growth diﬀerences. The second force, social
capability, is created by among other things institutions. Particularly
the institutions for human capital and research are apparently of cru-
cial importance for capacity to absorb foreign leading technology. These
include research, learning by doing, training on-the-job, vocational and
general education.
Fourth, modern endogenous growth theory oﬀers the possibility to
test the impact of international technology diﬀusion on economic growth.
A historical perspective may add insight to how the technology diﬀu-
sion mechanism works. Recent growth models implicitly incorporate the
concepts of absorptive capacity and appropriate institutions (Section
2.4.3), though this is still in its infancy. The current literature survey also
suggests that econometric estimations should be based on a structural
growth model in order to get an indication about causality and endo-
geneity. Misspeciﬁcations may blur the results. Finally the construction
of data and proxies should not be undervalued.
There is a need for more attention to international technology diﬀusion
and its mechanisms in the explanation of long run economic growth dif-
ferences. This issue is still open, particularly the empirical foundations
of a model with international technology diﬀusion (Howitt, 2002), and
its historical and institutional settings. How does the mechanism of in-
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ternational technology diﬀusion work? What role do human capital and
R&D play? And to what extent does international technology diﬀusion
ultimately aﬀect economic growth diﬀerences?
In the next three chapters, I develop a conceptual long run growth
framework and two endogenous growth models with international tech-
nology diﬀusion. I test the framework and the models with data and
highlight qualitative evidence on technology diﬀusion from the litera-
ture. The results of this research appears to largely conﬁrm the current
literature, and contributes to clarify the working of the mechanism of
international technology diﬀusion in an historical perspective.
